Embodiment and gender identity in virtual worlds:reconfiguring our "volatile bodies" by Fizek, Sonia & Wasilewska, Monika
1 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter 
published by Routledge in Creating Second Lives: 
Community, Identity and Spatiality as Constructions of 
the Virtual on 07/06/2011, available online: 
http://www.routledge.com/Creating-Second-Lives-
Community-Identity-and-Spatiality-as-
Constructions/Ensslin-Muse/p/book/9780415884204  
2 
Embodiment and Gender Identity in Virtual Worlds: 
Reconfiguring our “Volatile Bodies”1 
Sonia Fizek 
Monika Wasilewska 
 
Fizek, S. & Wasilewska, M. (2011). Embodiment and Gender Identity in Virtual Worlds: 
Reconfiguring our “Volatile Bodies”. In Creating Second Lives: Community, Identity and 
Spatiality as Constructions of the Virtual, eds. Astrid Ensslin and Eben Muse. New York: 
Routledge. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the emergence of graphical virtual worlds, such as Second Life (2003) and Entropia 
Universe (2003), the creation of our second lives in cyberspace no longer relies 
predominantly on text-based means, as it was in the case of MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons) 
or MOOs (object oriented MUDs). The focus of the online existence in VWs (virtual worlds) 
shifted from text-based descriptions to graphical representations of ourselves as avatars and 
of the virtual reality surrounding us. The customization of our virtual personas (choosing the 
name, adjusting body parts and selecting clothes) entails above all gender specification. As 
it turns out, coexisting in virtual communities as avatars, the majority of us seem to project 
an equivalent of reality onto our cyber bodies. Despite the fact that the Internet itself 
constitutes a flexible tool, which could be used to implement revolutionary ideas 
contradicting stable and fixed gender boundaries, the traditionally defined gender identity 
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based on binary oppositions (male versus female; heterosexual versus homosexual) is still 
being reinforced online. We are more likely to fill the virtual worlds with unusual objects or 
imaginary scenery than to populate them with gender ambiguous creatures. Oftentimes, in 
the most fantastic virtual spaces, our avatar’s gender identity constitutes the most stable point 
of reference.  
The research revolving around identity is, in most cases, based on the following key cultural 
and sociological markers: race, class, gender and sexuality (Bell 2001). This paper will focus 
on the question of embodiment and gender explicitly and will explore the implications of 
technology and cyberspace on the way gender identity is or may be constructed in virtual 
worlds, such as Second Life (SL) or Entropia Universe (EU).2 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first constitutes a theoretical introduction and 
places the problem of gender identity and body in a wider cultural context, encompassing 
postmodern and post-postmodern concepts on identity. We are referring mainly to chosen 
feminist theories, as they cover the most vivid disputes over the place of gender and body in 
Western culture. In our understanding, feminism (or feminisms) is the crossover area of 
various perspectives present in the contemporary humanities. Demarcating rigid boundaries 
between gender studies, women’s studies, queer theory etc. is not indispensable in this 
chapter (disregarding the fact that oftentimes it is impossible).  
In the second part, we will analyze how chosen theoretical perspectives are realized 
empirically in Second Life and Entropia Universe. Virtual worlds constitute communication 
technologies enabling its users to create arbitrary identities; hence we selected them as our 
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focus points. We decided upon such reference points as New Communication Technologies 
(NCTs) make perfect tools for the creation of arbitrary identities. Since in cyberspace we are 
not constrained by real bodies (cf. Doyle’s chapter, this volume) and we create our virtual 
bodies from scratch (although the metaphorical ‘meat’ has not been left behind), we could 
start the process of identity construction anew, entering the age of post-humans and cyborgs, 
existing beyond gender constraints in a post-gender world (Haraway 1991). 
Our aim is to examine whether users devoid of certain constraints in constructing themselves, 
create new identity models or whether they duplicate the ones present in reality. If so, what 
models will they be? A similar point was raised by Lisa Nakamura and Daniel Punday, who 
speculated whether “the Internet [can] propagate genuinely new and nonracist (and nonsexist 
and non-classist) ways of being, or [whether] it merely reflect[s] our culture at large” (quoted 
in Nakamura 2002: xii)? Nakamura further notices that the Internet may be viewed twofold: 
either as a progressive tool used to implement social change or as a “purveyor of crude and 
simplistic stereotypical cultural narratives” (xiii). In order to conduct a thorough and well 
informed analysis, and to place the research on the continuum between those bipolar 
attitudes, it is crucial to narrow the focus to a specific rhetorical space related to the Internet. 
Taking into account the diversity of online applications and considering Nakamura’s valid 
point we contained our study within the boundaries of virtual worlds only, disregarding other 
spaces, such as chat rooms, websites or fora. Observing the avatars in Second Life and 
Entropia Universe we will explore the question of identity construction online, and try to 
determine whether users creating their characters in cyberspace are “electing to perform 
versions of themselves as raced and gendered beings” (Nakamura 2002: xiv) or whether they 
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develop their cybertypes irrespective of various stereotypes, which are already at work in the 
offline world? 
Fluid Identity 
In accordance with classic theories put forward by the sociologists of culture, such as 
Zygmunt Bauman (2000; 2001; 2007) and Anthony Giddens (1991), identity is perceived as 
fluid and changeable, and its creation as a never-ending task. As Bauman notices, nowadays 
“… everyone has the right to choose who they want to be or become” (Bauman 2007: 27); 
“… everything may happen and all can be done … there are few footings in this world, which 
could be recognized as solid and trustworthy” (2000: 49). For Giddens, identity “… is not 
something that is just given, as a result of the continuities of the individual’s action-system, 
but something that has to be routinely created …” (Giddens 1991: 52). 
Such a state is, on the one hand, the consequence of the Entzauberung der Welt (Weber) – 
referring to rationalization and discovering the illusory nature of fundamental concepts – and 
on the other – the result of real civilization changes, which loosened up traditional national, 
religious or social ties. Globalization and the phenomenon of eradication influence “the 
stability and durability of identity, which under its influence become as ‘mobile’ as the world 
itself; changeable and unstable; evasive and elusive; uncertain and fluid” (Bauman 2001: 11). 
A community model, in which a group assigned a particular identity to the individual on the 
basis of constant cultural standards, seized to exist. It has been replaced by “hybrid identities” 
(Mamzer 2007: 8) comprising various elements, no longer inherited but constructed in 
accordance with individually chosen criteria. 
6 
It seems that the human body could be a stable support for the fixed identity. Inborn and 
irremovable, the body allows others to recognize our sex and race, which constitute the basis 
of self-determination for our selves. However, recently various practices have disturbed the 
cultural status of the body (particularly with reference to sex/gender), depriving it of its 
durability and certainty.  
The Body 
Since the turn of the 19th and 20th century onwards, in the Western Humanities the 
importance of embodiment has been increasing up to the point where it has become 
impossible to associate a human being with pure consciousness and following Descartes, to 
separate it from its corporeal foundation.  
Beforehand, the body connecting the human with temporality, unforeseeable natural forces, 
and the biological, perishable dimension of our existence, constituted an obstacle on the way 
to perfection, which - depending on the current philosophical or religious ideologies - was 
associated with the world of philosophical ideas, God or reason. According to Elizabeth 
Grosz, the Cartesian division of a human being into distinct substances (body as res extensa 
and mind as res cogitans) originates from Plato’s somatophobia (Grosz 1994: 5), and its final 
intensification was gained in the Age of Enlightenment.  
For the next 300 years following Descartes, philosophy sought to ‘tame’ the body, which 
more recently has begun to be perceived as something more than the vehicle for the mind. 
The following statement by Maurice Merleau-Ponty marks a symbolic end as well as the 
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beginning of a new chapter in corporeality: “I am not in front of my body… I am in it, or 
rather I am it” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 173). 
Interestingly, the first attempts to embody the subject were almost automatically associated 
with its sexualization. The Cartesian privilege of the mind was questioned by the assumptions 
of Freud’s psychoanalysis. Not only did he refute an idealized image of human 
consciousness, spotlighting its subconscious areas, but also emphasized human corporeality 
(sexuality). In The Mystery of Second Sex, Paweł Dybel claims that it is due to psychoanalysis 
that “referring to the universal, sexually neutral subject has become problematic” (Dybel 
2006: 7).3  
The question of the sexed body has been mostly scrutinized by feminism, both from its socio-
political as well as academic standpoint. Dealing with the above issue seemed inevitable, as 
it was determined by the culturally well established interpretation of the relation between the 
feminine and the corporeal, which are perceived to be of equal value (we will discuss this 
point in further paragraphs). Feminism could not have stayed indifferent with reference to 
this fact. Its relation to the body has been always ambivalent in that a successful liberating 
strategy could have consisted in the body’s radical transgression or, quite on the contrary, in 
its full cultural reconstruction. Due to such an extremely diverse attitude towards the body 
(as well as various other fundamental differences), we should not refer to feminism as a 
homogenous concept, but we should rather talk about feminisms.4   
Nowadays, it seems almost impossible to fully embrace all the diversity of feminism. The 
body, perceived as the basis for female identity, constitutes a criterion which allows for 
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partial systematization of all the branches. It should be stressed that the dualism of the body 
and mind – an order attributed to nature and culture respectively – is automatically followed 
by yet another dichotomy, that of femininity/masculinity. “Sometimes a woman is defined 
with the word 'sex’; she constitutes the body, delight, and danger” (Beauvoir 2003: 174). In 
the 1940’s, Simone de Beauvoir pointed to the above, exemplifying the cultural leveling of 
a man with the sexually neutral category of a human being, as opposed to a woman, who is 
always referred to as the Other. The causes and results of the above assumptions were 
analyzed in the 1970’s classic academic article of a significant title “Is Female to Male as 
Nature is to Culture?”: 
Because of woman’s greater bodily involvement with the natural functions 
surrounding reproduction, she is seen as more a part of nature than man is. (….) Since 
men lack a ‘natural’ basis (nursing, generalized to child care) for a familial 
orientation, their sphere of activity is defined at the level of interfamilial relations.  
(Ortner, et al. 1974: 76-79) 
Since it is men, not women, who are associated with culture (in opposition to nature) and as 
Ortner notices by creating it, men compensate for their reproductive incapacity, the culture 
embodies predominantly male subjectivity. Man becomes the universal symbol of 
humankind, an everyman combining all the plethora of human experiences in his self. 
“Identifying the cultural neutrum with a man is such a common practice that it has become 
imperceptible. Taking into consideration language ... male-oriented politics, history, 
literature, art and culture in general ... the universal and the common to all mankind is that 
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which is masculine” (Walczewska 2006: 125, authors’ translation). Femininity, being 
associated first and foremost with corporeality, 5 constitutes only one of the possible 
scenarios of humanity. Similarly to nature, which has to succumb to culture, a woman needs 
to accept male dominance. An alternative for this is for women to enter into the cultural 
sphere and fully participate in its creation. Allegedly, the above scenario may be realized 
twofold. 1. ‘As a woman’- the subject is defined with reference to sex, but it is done anew 
and not in opposition to what is masculine. 2. The second strategy assumes entering into the 
culture ‘as a man’, which is possible only once the binary oppositions have been invalidated 
and traditional concepts on femininity and masculinity deconstructed.  
Thus, a legitimate entanglement between the concepts of femininity and corporeality would 
form a stem from which various feminism branches sprout. Elaborating on the figure of 
feminism as a tree, its boughs seem to bifurcate into two interpretative tendencies: the 
affirmative and the deconstructive one.6 Historically, the first tendency originates in 
naturalistic and biological essentialism (1960’s and 1970's) while the second one in Cultural 
Theory representing the body as an entity formed by culture.  
Early essentialism, focusing on the universal nature (essence) of femininity, in its subsequent 
phases has been surpassed and turned into a multidirectional “sexual difference theory”. 
Sexual difference feminism is still looking for the specific character of femininity on the 
basis of female corporeality, albeit in a less biological and more symbolic sense, for instance 
by examining the ‘language’ or common experiences of women. Corporeal feminism, 
represented predominantly by Elizabeth Grosz or Susan Bordo, would constitute the most 
recent branch, in which the mind/body hierarchy has been turned upside down. It is the body, 
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not the mind, that constitutes the basis for the subject formation, and the dualism itself has 
been rejected in favor of a fluid body/mind consolidation. Corporeal feminism is an 
alternative to some concepts of postmodernism, which disregard the corporeal dimension and 
thus constitute the opposing branch of the bifurcation in feminism we have mentioned above.  
Its symbolic beginnings date back to Cultural Theory or constructionism (a movement in 
anthropology), which perceives every human action as influenced by culture. The rudiments 
were established in the 1930’s by Marcel Mauss or Margaret Mead, who demonstrated how 
body and gender are constructed in different societies. On the basis of similar assumptions, 
the differentiation between sex and gender could have been made and the faith in full 
biological determinism could have been questioned. 
Inspired by the poststructuralist concepts, over time constructionism developed into “gender 
theories”, questioning all material foundations of femininity (and masculinity), and pointing 
to their relative and performative nature. Gender is treated as a category created either by 
means of socio-cultural practices (see Michel Foucault and ‘power-knowledge’) or discourse 
(see the concept of ‘différance’ introduced by Jacques Derrida). The traditional concept of 
subjectivity has been also broken down, and as a result queer theory (with Judith Butler as 
its precursor) and gender transgressions have come into being.  
None of the above tendencies constitutes a coherent whole. However, it may be observed that 
their bifurcation duplicates the academic opposition of sex vs. gender; as the first trend 
defines femininity by means of widely used biological categories, while the second one by 
their socio-cultural counterparts. Such a distinction gives rise to the problems of theoretical 
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and political nature. Theoreticians supporting sexual difference feminism are accused of 
secondary sex polarization, and deriving gender identity from the body seems to be somewhat 
controversial. For instance, Grosz claims that gender cannot exist in the body of the opposite 
sex, and the surgical change performed by transsexuals constitutes a mere “crude 
transformation” (Grosz 1993: 207-208; Hyży 2003: 249). On the other hand, the 
deconstruction of sex and the affirmation of fluid identities contribute to the very dispersion 
of the category of a woman, which comprises the basis for feminist activity. If we assume 
that gender is not determined by the body, but depends entirely on our choices, practicing the 
politics of equality becomes even more difficult. Yet another accusation may refer to the 
abstract nature of theories, which do not adhere to real life. The above status quo has been 
very accurately summarized by Inga Iwasiów (a well-known Polish feminist), who 
commented on Braidotti’s vision of ‘nomadic subjects’ in the following words: “While 
nomadology is a romantic and postindustrial adventure, concrete persons fight for their 
identity, in the world of which having a passport is a privilege/burden” (Iwasiów 2004: 194). 
However, does constructionism belong entirely to the academic utopia? We should refer here 
to two different standpoints. Not only have they approached identity from different 
perspectives, but also turned out to be practically applicable, which makes them an inspiring 
starting point for further reflections. 
The first and most obvious association is connected with Judith Butler, one of the most 
distinct representatives of postmodernity. According to Butler not only gender but also sex 
is artificial and constructed, and so the opposition between the two is eliminated. Butler does 
not undermine the existence of biological differences and does not negate real bodies, but 
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rather questions their ‘reality’. For her, the bodies are the carriers of cultural significance. 
Although they are not fictitious in themselves, it is the fiction that constructs and signifies 
them. Using the word fiction we refer to cultural norms connected with gender – the norms 
which do not originate from the bodies, but are imposed upon them. Defining the body as 
either male of female places it in the heteronormative social order. In the light of Butler’s 
concept, the question of ‘being’ a woman or a man is not considered in terms of fate, but 
emphasizes its performative dimension. Gender may be treated as a corporeal style. It is also 
a space for all the subversive acts - dressing-up, parody, stylization – treating sex 
instrumentally (drag queens, drag kings, cross-dressing). Butler not only changes the 
established interpretation of sex/gender, but also describes people, for whom gender 
instability (transgender, ambigender, non-gendered, gender-neutral, gender liminal, 
agendered, etc.)7 forms the basis of their identity. These people refer to gender irrespective 
of their sex. The following quotations clearly illustrate the point made by Butler (although 
being from two entirely different sources, they describe the same bodily reality). The first 
one constitutes the philosophical description of the bodily condition in postmodernity as 
understood by Monika Bakke: 
Disregarding anatomy, humans have the possibility to embody various cultural 
genders, without the necessity to support one of the sites. By doing so they gain a 
multiple social identity. The assumption that one body corresponds to one cultural 
gender is no longer in force, which leads to gender relativism.  
(Bakke 2000: 148) 
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In the latter one, members of a domain-specific portal for cross-dressers have turned the 
complex academic cultural theories into a few straight-forward sentences describing their 
lived experience as individuals freed from gender constraints: 
There are no boundaries. There are no divisions into men and women. There is no 
grammatical gender connected with sex. We play with names; with verbs; with 
language. There is no feminine or masculine. Everything just is.  
(All about crossdressing, comment posted on May 15, 2006) 
An equally revolutionary concept was introduced by Donna Haraway (1991), although its 
character is somewhat different. Instead of the academic interpretation of the category of 
gender, Haraway creates a vision of its final transgression by creating a post-gender or post-
human body. The strategy of surpassing corporeality may be achieved by a cyborg, being a 
combination of a man (woman) and a machine, and creating a hybrid organism, which 
guarantees the elimination of natural differences existing between the sexes. If the skin is no 
longer the borderline for the body, the cyborg has the power to subvert the natural order. This 
blurs the boundary between the body and technology, between nature and culture, and thus 
between femininity and masculinity. As Agnieszka Gajewska notices, this shift is achieved 
by means of a “patriarchal and military” product, which “has been used against their fathers” 
(Gajewska 2008: 82). The myth of a cyborg is developed by Sadie Plant, who created 
theoretical foundations of cyberfeminism – a multilayered women’s activity in the Internet.8 
Acting in alliance with technology, women can become fully emancipated, as their common 
ground lies in being subordinate to men (Plant 1996; 1997). The activity of cyberfeminists, 
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oftentimes controversial and subversive (as in the case of ‘cybergrrls’), corresponds to the 
above statement. Women unite in groups - such as the most popular Old Boys Network and 
VNS Matrix – and their activity surpasses the boundaries of cyberspace and encompasses, 
for instance organizing international conferences in real life. 
Preliminary conclusions 
The postmodern discussion on sex/gender oftentimes includes the convergence of theory and 
practice. We cannot disregard people for whom the evident transgressing of gender 
boundaries, or manifesting it in opposition to the well-established social norms, constitutes 
the basis for self-definition. In the light of the above observations, we are posing the 
following question: are gender and corporeal transgressions only appealing to minorities or 
do they reflect the universal longing of the postmodern human for fluid identity? Bearing the 
above issues in mind, we will analyze these relations focusing on two of the most popular 
virtual platforms (Second Life and, to a lesser degree, Entropia Universe). We will perceive 
these virtual worlds as the areas in which the virtual equivalent of real9 life is created.  
The question of ‘net utopianism’ has been raised by quite a few researchers (e.g. Faith 
Wilding 2001; Katherine Hayles 1999; Donna Haraway 1991) and so our aim is neither to 
reformulate it nor to use it as our own original idea.10 In this paper we will, however, focus 
on concrete examples. In so doing, we seek to examine the role of body in cyberspace, 
concentrating on the experience of avatars, taking into account avatars’ interaction with the 
interface elements.  
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CASE STUDY: VIRTUAL WORLDS 
The question of gender in two of the most popular virtual platforms (e.g. Second Life and 
Entropia Universe) seems to be inextricably connected with graphical representations of our 
virtual personas, i.e. avatars. Social interactions in those worlds are no longer achieved by 
means of text-based descriptions only (as it was in case of Multi User Dungeons – MUDs, 
which we will briefly discuss in the following paragraph), but include visual stimuli and 
virtual body language as well. Since our perceptions and categorizations with respect to 
gender, race and class are based on appearance, the importance of a corporeal dimension in 
virtual worlds cannot and should not be downplayed. Prior to a closer analysis of embodiment 
and re-embodiment and its interdependence with the process of avatar creation, we would 
like to delineate the distinction between virtual worlds (VWs), virtual realities (VRs) and 
virtual environments (VEs), as well as discuss briefly the notions of the real, the virtual and 
the actual (Boellstorff 2008: 20-21). 
 
 
Virtual worlds, virtual realities or virtual environments? 
In order to be terminologically consistent, we would like to emphasize the differentiation 
between the following terms: virtual world (VW), virtual reality (VR) and virtual 
environment (VE). In the 1990‘s Sherry Turkle (e.g. in Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age 
of the Internet) referred to text-based virtual communities (MUDs) as virtual realities. 
Although she did mention the importance of hardware (helmets, goggles, data gloves), she 
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decided to refer to MUDs as to “text-based, social virtual reality” (Turkle 1995: 181). Richard 
Bartle narrows down the definition and notices that “… virtual reality is primarily concerned 
with the mechanisms by which human beings can interact with computer simulations; it is 
not especially bothered by the nature of the simulations themselves” (Bartle 2004 quoted in 
Boellstorff 2008: 20). In other words, the sense of immersion in VR is triggered by interface 
technologies, e.g. data gloves or goggles, which constitute the basis for the VR reception. 
Virtual worlds, on the other hand, rely mainly on the users’ experience generated by means 
of graphical interface or in the earlier days – a text-based one (see: MUDs and Object 
Oriented MUDs, i.e. MOOs). Thus, taking into consideration Bartle’s remark, Second Life 
or Entropia Universe should be referred to as virtual worlds, not virtual realities (although 
some researchers might use the category of VR here). Another term we would like to call 
into question is a virtual environment (VE), or to be more specific, a collaborative virtual 
environment (CVE), which exemplifies an immersive virtual reality. As Jeremy Bailenson 
points out “CVEs are systems that track verbal and nonverbal signals of multiple interactants 
and render those signals onto avatars, three-dimensional, digital representations of people in 
a shared digital space” (Bailenson 2006: 255). CVE might be perceived as the next step in 
videoconferencing techniques in that it maps the movement in the physical world to the one 
taking place in the virtual environment. Just as in the case of VR, it is the mechanisms and 
interface technologies that play a crucial role here.  
The above distinction between the three different terms referring to the virtual sphere may 
seem somewhat simplistic, but our intention is to merely outline the idiosyncrasies and clarify 
the choice of terminology, so as to make it more consistent. Therefore, in this paper, we are 
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using the terms virtual worlds, virtual platforms or, alternatively, virtual universes (the latter 
one used specifically in reference to Entropia Universe). 
The Virtual, the Real and the Actual 
Conducting research in the virtual, it seems almost inevitable not to juxtapose it with the 
concept of the real. However apparent the virtual-real opposition may seem at first, the 
phenomenon is far more complex. The issue has been raised by Boellstorff in one of the most 
recent publications on Second Life. Drawing on extensive analyses concerning the virtual 
made by other researchers (e.g. Taylor 2006; Deleuze 2004; Markham 1998), Boellstorff 
concludes that the virtual is in fact real and should be rather opposed to the actual instead. 
He agrees with the presumption that our experiences online (in virtual worlds) are perceived 
and felt as real, and may turn out to be as meaningful as the ones encountered offline. “In 
other words, ‘real’ often acts simply as a synonym for 'offline', and does not imply a 
privileged ontological status …” (Boellstorff 2008: 20). The virtual thus becomes part of the 
real, and both states are opposed by the actual world. Nevertheless, in our understanding the 
categories of the virtual and the real belong to two mutually exclusive orders - the former 
focusing on what is created, the latter on what is experienced. Boellstorff does emphasize the 
same question, evoking the etymology of the adjective “actual”, which originates from the 
verb “act” (from L.L. actualis ‘active’, adj. form of L. actus; cf. ‘act’).11 He does so, however, 
to stress the fact that both these terms (the virtual and the actual) belong to the same order 
and hence they qualify to be juxtaposed. We, on the other hand, argue that since the virtual 
and the real are governed by different rules and express divergent levels of our existence (that 
which is made/created and that, which is experienced), the distinction between them does not 
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disrupt the understanding of the virtual-real relation. Also, since we are referring to the 
question of corporeality (corpus from L., lit. ‘body’; reality from L.L. realis; meaning ‘real 
existence’),12 bringing up the real instead of the actual makes our argumentation more 
consistent. Thus, directing the reader’s attention to the allegedly problematic distinction 
between the virtual and the real, we have decided not to introduce further terminological 
confusion and simply use the virtual when referring to the virtual worlds, and the real when 
referring to the ‘actual’ world. 
VIRTUAL BODIES, OR ‘DO AVATARS DREAM OF ELECTRIC 
STEAK?’13 
Having introduced some theoretical background and hopefully clarified major terminological 
issues, we are now moving on to the second part of our paper, in which we shall look for 
reference points of chosen theoretical standpoints in the empirical process of creating one’s 
gender identity in SL and EU.  
In the first few paragraphs we will focus on the corporeal dimension of avatar creation and 
their very existence within virtual worlds, i.e. Second Life and Entropia Universe. Referring 
to Kristeva’s notion of abject, we will touch upon the question of the virtual body and its 
gender constraints exemplified in the above platforms. The avatar will constitute our starting 
point in the discussion on fluid identity, disembodiment and re-embodiment, and the utopian 
dream of a post-gender world as evoked by e.g. Donna Haraway in “A Cyborg Manifesto” 
(1991). To put some order into this multilayered discussion, we have arranged it in terms of 
three main thematic areas. First, we will focus on the process of avatar creation (body 
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creation) in Second Life and Entropia Universe. Our second area will revolve around the 
question of experiencing the avatar’s body through the interface. And finally, we will 
concentrate on the social dimension of bodily interaction and examine the phenomenon of 
gender restricted regions in SL. All of the above phenomena discussed by us belong to the 
visual channel of communication. We will not focus on text-based or auditory channels.14  
Creating the Avatar’s Body 
The notions of embodiment or disembodiment or re-embodiment became particularly 
important and relevant as soon as virtual worlds moved from the era of text-based ‘chat 
rooms’ (MUDs) to complex graphical spaces inhabited by avatars equipped with perceptible 
cyberbodies. Since the focus shifted from the textual to the graphical, the process of creating 
one's virtual persona has considerably changed. The purely verbal dimension (performing a 
socializing function) prevalent in MUDs has been moved to the background. In graphical 
virtual worlds “embodiment [has] become central to online selfhood …” (Boellstorff 2008: 
134). Among four prime needs of SL avatars for instance, the communicative and 
interpersonal one, constitutes 24%. The predominant need (41%) tends to be the aesthetic 
one, based on the avatars’ appearance (Ensslin 2011b: n.p.). Such a shift, both from the 
textual to the graphical and what follows from the interpersonal (text-based) to the 
performative, marks great changes in the construction of gender as well. It seems as if our 
imagination was constrained by visual means of description and as a result avatars became 
more standardized, restricted in their bodily form and gender. In the early text-based virtual 
worlds (MUDs), users were given the possibility to choose from up to ten different gendered 
and agendered identities, represented by a pronominal system: 15 
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Neuter: it, it, its, its, itself 
Male: he, him, his, his, himself 
Female: she, her, her, hers, herself 
Either: s/he, him/her, his/her, his/hers, him/herself 
Spivak: e, em, eir, eirs, eirself 
Splat: *e, h*, h*s, h*self 
Plural: they, them, their, theirs, themselves 
Egotistical: I, me, my, mine, myself 
Royal: we, us, our, ours, ourselves 
2nd: you, you, your, yours, yourself  
(Rosenberg 1992)  
As Boellstorff rightly notices “these ‘genders’ refer to linguistic gender and assume lack of 
visual embodiment” (2008: 140). Even though the majority of MUD residents would 
categorize themselves as either male or female (Rosenberg 1992), there were other more 
flexible possibilities for the ones wishing to transgress the obvious gender boundaries. 
Having more advanced tools at our disposal, we have apparently moved from flexibly 
gendered MUDs to virtual platforms, such as SL or Entropia Universe, where the user’s 
choice is oftentimes limited to two genders only. Although in SL it is possible to change 
one’s embodiment (e.g. into an animal or an inanimate object) just the way one would change 
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their t-shirt or haircut, there are only two gender options available in the ‘Appearance’ tab 
(either male or female), which restricts a fully malleable agendered process of creation of our 
virtual personae.  
While the Second Life platform required avatars to be either male or female, it was 
easy to take on an embodiment that did not clearly mark gender (a box, for instance, 
or a blue ball of light, or an androgynous figure). 
(Boellstorff 2008: 143) 
In this sense, it seems as if our online bodies in SL were prima facie subject to flexibility and 
fluidity. Also, in Second Life one can switch between the available genders and modify the 
appearance of one’s avatar repeatedly during the avatar’s virtual life. The name of the avatar, 
once chosen, cannot be altered, so in order to disguise oneself efficaciously, it is advisable to 
pick a neutral name.  
The fact that the appearance of one’s avatar in SL may be altered at any time implies the 
possibility to create one’s identity beyond the constraints of corporeality. It is, however, the 
virtual community that imposes the restrictive rules on its users. Since the avatar’s name 
cannot be altered, every possible permutation of its body is still assigned to a particular virtual 
persona, entangled in fixed social relations. Since frequent appearance modifications are not 
highly approved by the SL community, most of the avatars keep their visual representations 
stable throughout their SL lives. 
Entropia Universe is even more restrictive. Not only can the user choose between two genders 
only (either female or male), but once created, the appearance of the avatar cannot be 
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changed. The announcement on the welcome screen states the following: “You will not be 
able to make changes once you ‘accept’ your appearance.” As declared by the EU’s 
developer, enhancing the avatar’s appearance may be performed only by a hair dresser or by 
a face or body sculptor. When it comes to “sculpting” the avatar’s body, both in SL and EU, 
it is possible to adjust particular body parts, and so our female avatar may exhibit masculine 
body features (and vice versa). It is worth noticing, though, that the very framework is still 
very limited; our avatar will not be extremely fat (a certain degree of obesity is possible), 
bony or wrinkled. The “Randomize” option in SL, on the other hand, allows us to follow a 
standardized masculine or feminine embodiment, which succumbs to the stereotypical 
representation of females and males – slim waist and wide hips versus muscular shoulders in 
the latter case.  
The representations of femininity and masculinity in the above virtual worlds seem to comply 
strongly with socially acceptable norms and further reinforce gender classifications. This 
stereotyped visual bipolarity, as Schmieder (2009: 8-9)16 rightly notices, depends on the 
decisions made by the designers and/or programmers of a particular platform. Gamers/users, 
however, do play a crucial role in the process of creation. It is their attitude that is taken into 
consideration by the producers during ‘alpha’ and ‘beta' tests.  
Having briefly looked at the process of avatar creation in Second Life and Entropia Universe, 
we will now move on to some theoretical reflections questioning the supposedly flexible 
nature of virtual worlds and cyberspace. In the light of some postmodern as well as post-
postmodern theories we will refer to in this section, new technologies seemingly empower 
us to create our identities (and cyberbodies) from scratch. Our enacted bodies (real life bodies 
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placed in front of the computer screen, cf. Hayles 1999) impose a certain social identity on 
us. We are recognized and judged by others on the basis of our sex, race, ethnicity, social 
status, amongst many others, regardless of whether these categories comply with our own 
perception of ourselves.  
In cyberspace, on the other hand, it is us who decide what data (e.g. bodily categories) we 
want to disclose to others as our virtual bodies are fully formable or at least this is the way 
we would like it to be. We impose a particular image of ourselves (in case of SL or EU that 
image is reflected in our avatar) on the online society. It seems as if virtual worlds enabled 
us to be highly creative in constructing our identities. Since in cyberspace we are devoid of 
enacted bodies, we could re-embody and recreate ourselves blurring the boundaries at will. 
However, we do not seem to be making use of this opportunity and instead we create a mere 
virtual equivalent of the well known reality. Even though the Internet allows us to 
impersonate different identities and genders, most of the time we do not dispute the well 
established identity based on binary oppositions – feminine vs. masculine, hetero- vs. 
homosexual etc. The Internet, the virtual, although being a technology of great potentiality, 
is still based on the heteronormative cultural, social and political order. The tool that could 
be well used to implement revolutionary ideas existing in theory becomes the tool promoting 
the essentialist point of view. So, how may the process of avatar creation in SL or Entropia 
Universe be analyzed in the context of fluidity or a utopian post-human and post-gender 
cyberspace? 
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, graphical virtual worlds have shifted our attention 
to the corporeal dimension of virtual existence (however contradictory the juxtaposition may 
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seem). In the light of the Cartesian body-mind split prevalent in e.g. cyberpunk fiction (cf. 
Neuromancer by William Gibson 1984), disembodiment is considered to be the ideal form 
of virtual existence. The so called ‘jacking in’ (leaving the ‘meat' behind) presupposes 
abandoning the body and uploading the consciousness into the virtual, ipso facto enabling a 
pure connection with the technological medium.  
A similar attitude towards the body as a limitation was also present in the academic discourse 
revolving around the post-human view, in which a human being was perceived “… as a set 
of informational processes” (Hayles 1999: 4). As Katherine Hayles further explains, 
“Embodiment has been systematically downplayed or erased in the cybernetic construction 
of the post-human …” (Hayles 1999: 4). The information pattern, the code, the mind were 
regarded as the superior components of post-human existence. Evoking Gibson's metaphor 
again, the post-human body may be described as ‘data made flesh’. The body, if considered 
at all, acts as a prosthesis controlled by our consciousness. Yet again, in the dialogue between 
nature and culture, the latter one turns out to be taking the helm. In “A Cyborg Manifesto” 
Haraway refers to “… the utopian tradition of imagining a world without gender; … the 
cyborg [being] a creature in a post-gender world …” (Haraway 1991: 154). And although the 
body is present in her dream, it is not constrained by the organic wholeness and has no origins 
in Western thought. It is a merger between humans and machines, which questions the binary 
oppositionist nature of our existence. “The dichotomies between mind and body, animal and 
human, organism and machine, public and private, nature and culture, men and women, 
primitive and civilized are all in question ideologically” (Haraway 1991: 151). The concept 
of a cyborg is supposed to liberate women from the patriarchal order, which is responsible 
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for the present gender, race or class consciousness. Haraway notices that communication 
technologies give women the possibility to re-craft their bodies and create new social 
relations, new meanings, not necessarily encapsulating female embodiment within the role 
of the mother. In the case of women, therefore, the notions of becoming disembodied or 
cyborg-like signify freedom from the constraints of the patriarchal social system.  
Eventually, all those abstract theories and literary dreams had the chance to realize 
themselves online (in text-based MUDs), where the textual body could have been re-crafted, 
redefined or abandoned altogether. A similar situation took place in the late 1970s and 
prevailed in 1980s (with the outburst of MUDs), when, as Sherry Turkle observes, the 
abstract philosophical ideas of the decentered and multiple self were concretized by 
experiencing online communities. “The disjuncture between theory (the unitary self is an 
illusion) and live experience (the unitary self is the most basic reality)” was brought down to 
earth (Turkle 1999: 646). There is, however, one crucial difference between the two scenarios 
- while in the latter case purely theoretical assumptions found their practical counterpart 
online, the dream of a disembodied cyborg devoid of gender never came true.  
As it turned out, the physical body situated in front of the screen cannot be disregarded and 
ignoring its importance will not help women in building a more independent social image. It 
seems as if the reflection on the body in cyberspace has proceeded from leaving the ‘meat' 
behind to its rehabilitation and reformulation of its importance. The body has been moved 
from the periphery to the center of analysis (especially in corporeal feminism, cf. Grosz 
1994). After all, the body made of flesh and bones sits in front of the screen and interacts 
physically with the computer in order to launch the mind into the virtual and re-embody itself. 
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This phenomenon may be referred to as the double-situatedness of the body, which “implies, 
on the one hand, that user-readers are ‘embodied’ as direct receivers, whose bodies interact 
with the hardware and software of a computer. On the other, user-readers are considered to 
be ‘re-embodied’ through feedback that they experience in represented form, e.g., through 
visible or invisible avatars…” (Ensslin 2009: 158). The concept of the human-machine 
cybernetic feedback loop has become settled in the academic discourse in recent years and 
seems to be giving justice to both, mind and body. Not only has the Cartesian dualism long 
gone, but the importance of the body itself has been revived. Human-machine interaction is 
as dependent on the cognitive processes as it is on physical reciprocity.  
The above theories constitute just a fraction of various attitudes that have sprung up in recent 
years. For the purpose of this paper we decided to focus on a few, which seem to track the 
changes cybernetics and body studies have undergone. Some of the ideas presented in this 
paragraph had the chance to move from theory into practice and be concretized in cyberspace 
(e.g. the fractured and multiple self), and some remained in the sphere of pure theory. As said 
previously, although new communication technologies give us the possibility to become even 
more flexible and escape binary oppositions, we use them to reinforce the already existing 
ones. We re-embody female or male avatars, we create gender restricted regions (in SL), we 
form societies and rules corresponding to the ones valid in real life. And even though our SL 
avatar may become a ball of light or an androgynous figure, from the level of the interface 
we are still either male or female. Our eccentric outfit (texture) becomes one of the clothing 
items we may put on. In MUDs (as mentioned in the previous paragraphs) some attempts 
were made to give more gender freedom to its users. However, since we have moved from 
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text-based virtual platforms to graphical worlds, such as SL or EU, gender arbitrariness seems 
to have become restricted. It may be due to the fact that these platforms are no longer created 
by online communities, but by commercial companies, which are not focused on fulfilling 
the needs of niche users. 
Experiencing the Virtual Body 
We will now move on to the second thematic area revolving around the subject of 
experiencing the virtual body, and focus briefly on the interface elements in SL, discussing 
their significance in creating the stereotypical heteronormative model of avatar behavior. 
Since experiencing the real body by going beyond its rigid and stable boundaries (various 
body fluids, which cross the body’s surface, i.e. skin) constitutes an extremely important 
dimension of our corporeal existence, we will draw on Kristeva’s notion of the abject with 
reference to avatars’ bodies as well. 
Stereotyped heteronormative bipolarity in SL is not only reinforced by means of graphical 
representation, but is also reflected in our avatar’s motor skills, such as walking, sitting, 
dancing or making gestures. As it turns out, experiencing the virtual world and interacting 
with its objects and other avatars by means of SL interface, is to a large extent determined 
by our avatar’s sex. As part of our methodology of research involved spending several hours 
in SL and interacting with its content, we encountered numerous instances supporting the 
above point.  
The most discernible manifestation of heteronormativity refers to our avatar’s walking style. 
In SL, those motor skills are clearly dependant on the avatar's sex. Our female avatar swayed 
28 
her hips gently, while its male counterpart plodded along in a stereotypically masculine 
manner, invading the cyberspace self-confidently with his straight-up chest and wide arms. 
Interestingly, the way avatars sit also exhibits their physicality dependent on sex. It is not 
possible for a female avatar to walk or sit like a man. To communicate with one another, 
avatars may also use a plethora of gesture patterns. Apart from the standardized gestures, we 
have a number of female or male shrugs, cries or chuckles to choose from. Some gestures are 
also accompanied by auditory effects accordingly. ‘Dance Balls’ constitute one of the most 
entertaining phenomena relating to gender and sex movement manifestations. The two round 
objects placed above the dance floor may be activated by clicking. Pink dance ball is meant 
for female avatars and blue for males. We made our avatar dance in the Fabglitter Woman's 
Club (a place for women only) by clicking on the ‘Intan Feminine Dance Ball’ and browsing 
through many different dance styles for female avatars, e.g. easy kneesy, boogie or lime jelly. 
There are also dance balls intended for couples (abiding by heterosexual norms only). Even 
in SL gay clubs, the couple dance balls are divided corresponding either to male or female 
dance styles. One can, however, activate a male dance ball for a female avatar, which may 
be perceived as the manifestation of fluidity, at least to a certain extent.  
Having browsed through various gesture patterns, we came across ‘female cry’. We double-
clicked the gesture to play animation and sound. To our astonishment, the avatar, although 
crying out loud in a very realistic manner, did not shed literal tears (the same applies to 
avatars in EU). This experience pointed us in the direction of examining the avatar's body, 
taking into consideration its fluids and what follows, Kristeva’s notion of the abject. As Grosz 
notices “the abject is what of the body falls away from it while remaining irreducible to the 
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subject/object and inside/outside oppositions” (Grosz 1994: 192). The idea of the abject is 
closely related to body fluids (i.e. tears, sweat, menstrual blood, saliva, vomit etc.), which 
“attest to the permeability of the body, its necessary dependence on an outside, its liability to 
collapse into this outside … to the perilous divisions between the body’s inside and its 
outside”(Grosz 1994: 193). The avatars’ virtual bodies in SL and EU are empty and therefore 
stable and fixed in that they do not secrete bodily fluids. Since they are deprived of their fluid 
and unstable dimension, they may be defined by and reduced to binary oppositions, such as 
inside/outside or subject/object. Lack of bodily fluids with reference to avatars may be also 
an interesting point, when it comes to the way body is (or bodies are) idealized in our culture 
– body as a stable object regulating the influence of fluids (in our case completely 
withstanding their influence) is perceived as pure and clean. Therefore, the virtual bodies in 
SL or EU may be regarded as superior to their real counterparts. The concept of the pure and 
idealized body links to the remark on the avatars’ bodies made in the previous paragraphs – 
SL and EU avatars cannot be obese, bony and they never get old. In case of virtual bodies in 
the above platforms, certain parts and functions have been privileged, while others minimized 
or left underrepresented (Grosz 1994: 192). As Grosz explains, “it is the ... culture [that 
effectively intervenes] into the constitution of the value of the body” (192). In other words, 
the avatar’s body may be referred to as the proper social body; the reflection of the process 
of cultural codification and construction. 
Sexual relations between the avatars of both sexes, analyzed with reference to the abject 
theory, constitute another interesting point. As Grosz notices, “ in certain cultures each of the 
sexes can pose a threat to the other, a threat that is located in the polluting powers of the 
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other’s body fluids” (Grosz 1994: 193). In Second Life the avatars may have sexual 
intercourses and the genitals are easily visible, however, no transfer of sex fluids occurs. In 
the light of Grosz’s remark, we may assume that the role of the female body and the notion 
of sexual difference in virtual worlds has been shifted. Since the avatars do not secrete any 
fluids (and may be thus perceived as empty or two-dimensional only), the uncontrollable 
element of the female body - connected with leaking and lack of self-containment (Grosz 
1994: 203) - is no longer in force. Female avatars’ bodies may no longer be treated as 
containers or vessels. The distinction between women as corresponding to nature and men to 
culture has been also undermined with reference to virtual worlds. Pushing these conclusions 
even further, we may say that the female body has been thus reconstructed and re-embodied 
in the virtual, thus regaining control and an equal cultural status with the male body.    
However, since there is no exchange between the inside and the outside, and the avatars’ 
bodies are two-dimensional only, a crucial question arises - can they be treated and 
interpreted as legitimate bodies at all? Maybe it is more reasonable to refer to the avatars’ 
skins, which points to the surface and thus the outer (and only) layer of these virtual bodies. 
Moving from virtual worlds to the realm of video games, it is worth noticing that in some of 
them the superficiality of the virtual bodies is transgressed to a certain degree and graphical 
representations of selected bodily fluids do occur. As Ensslin accurately points out, “food 
and energy provision, intake and expenditure have a crucial function in the macrostructure 
of a large number of videogames” (Ensslin 2011a: n.p.). This does not mean, however, that 
the avatar’s body in every game is subject to physiological processes. One of the most 
interesting examples, from the point of view of the abject theory, is The Sims 2 (Electronic 
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Arts, 2006), where Sims succumb to the following needs: hunger and bladder. The latter case 
is particularly interesting as “… visits to the toilet are not tabooed or semiotically erased” 
(Ensslin 2011a: n.p.). This adds a highly realistic dimension to the life of the Sims and 
metaphorically fills their bodies and enables the interaction between the inside of their bodies 
and the outside world. Apparently, Sims can also get sick, in which case vomiting takes place. 
The instances of abject, however, are very rarely depicted in video games. Food consumption 
- be it organic, synthetic or abstract - is a very popular interface element in many games, but 
hardly ever is it interlinked with the processes of excretion.  
Gender-restricted SL Regions 
As we have presented in the above paragraphs, gender fluidity in SL or EU may be and is 
restricted by means of the very interface. In such case, the users do not have a direct influence 
on that process and in order to interact within the virtual world, they have to follow the rules 
established by the producers. On the other hand, SL allows its users to create their own land, 
clubs, shops and other venues, for which the guidelines or terms of use are established by the 
users themselves. Theoretically, with the help of given interface elements, one might create 
an unconventional region devoid of traditional social constraints or gender restrictions. Yet 
again, users do not eradicate identity based on binary oppositions. The model of Internet 
identities merely mirrors the model of the ones present in the real world. Hence, SL is filled 
with gender restricted regions, which further contributes to the limitation of flexibility. The 
phenomenon related to generating such places, reflects very accurately one of the viewpoints 
presented by cyber feminists. As the cyberspace seems to be a zone predominantly governed 
by male users, it is understandable that women demand a fair share in its creation. Women 
32 
try to conquer and seize this new space, stereotypically being in the possession of men. In 
the light of such arguments, the creation of gender restricted regions in SL seems justified to 
a certain degree. To examine how this phenomenon is realized in virtual worlds, we have 
explored a few SL regions for women only. Having visited the Isle of Lesbos, for instance, 
we found out that land rental in the district of “Whispering Big Pines” is intended exclusively 
for women. One of the points in the agreement states the following: “In order to rent on the 
Whispering Big Pines region you must be female” (Second Life). Clearly, this regulation is 
in force with reference to the avatar’s appearance. It operates, thus, on the virtual level only 
and one should not confuse it with the actual person sitting in front of the computer screen.  
FabGlitter Women’s Club operates in accordance with even more limiting and restrictive 
rules. Again, FabGlitter is a male free zone. There are certain exceptions to the rule, but in 
such a case male avatars need to wear special tags not to be banned from the region. It is 
surprising how exclusive such places may be when it comes to the avatar's appearance. 
Avatars are most welcome to FabGlitter “as long as they are in a female shape (butch or 
androgenous is welcome just not male specific shapes)” (Second Life). After hours of 
research, we have stumbled upon Venus Beach, whose rules have struck us yet again as being 
extremely gender restrictive. The beach allows heterosexual, bi-sexual, lesbian as well as 
transexual/transgender women. Also, its owners do specify what exactly they mean by a male 
avatar – “Our basic definition of a man is an AV with a penis, and/or having an obvious 
masculine physical form” (Second Life). Male avatars, once entering the beach, are ejected 
and/or banned. The virtual body as the indicator of one’s sex and presumably gender turns 
out to be a determinant factor in restricting one’s access to certain regions or sites.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
The question of embodiment, gender and fluid identity may be scrutinized from numerous 
perspectives. Taking into account the size constraints of this chapter, we have focused on 
gender and body with relation to virtual worlds. Having examined the above notions, 
concentrating on a purely visual channel of virtual worlds (as opposed to the textual and the 
auditory ones further elaborated on by Schmieder 2009), we have touched upon the following 
thematic scopes: the avatar’s body, experiencing it through the interface, and finally its 
placement in SL gender restricted regions. Extrapolating from various theories relating to 
identity (Dybel 2006; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Bauman 2000; Giddens 1991), gender (Hyży 
2003; Butler 1999; Hayles 1999; Haraway 1991) or net utopianism (Wilding 2001), among 
many others, we conclude that cyberspace is not liberating users from heteronormative and 
phallocentric constraints. However, this current situation is not rooted in the nature of the 
medium, which does allow for flexibility, but in the users themselves who recreate their 
social, cultural and political experiences of the real world in their cybernetic communities. 
Theoretically, we have the facilities to enter an age of gender-free cyborgs liberated from 
bodily constraints, but the question is whether the post-human reality is a dream projected by 
a handful of researchers that does not seem to reflect general tendencies present in the 
postmodern society. 
The topic we have examined from one of many possible perspectives has a lot of potential 
and constitutes rich material for future research. Possible thematic ramifications may 
concentrate on various other online phenomena. Body rehabilitation and its reconstruction as 
understood by corporeal and cyberfeminism can be linked with the fact that women are taking 
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the helm of originally masculinist cyberspace. Regaining cyberspace by women takes place 
on many different levels. They establish varied support groups or cultural projects, such as 
Old Boys Network, Wise-Women, the Bitch magazine or ArtWomen.17 Excluding virtual 
worlds, Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs) and video games 
in general also constitute fertile ground for gender analysis. As far as gaming and women 
support groups are concerned, Grrl Gamer comprises one of the most interesting cases 
relating to the fact that women begin to find their legitimate place in the gaming field, 
originally a male dominated zone.18   
There are many more examples of the above kind, which only adds strength to the fact that 
gender related issues do make up an extremely broad field. We hope our perspective on the 
role of gender and body in virtual worlds contributed to a greater understanding of the above 
phenomena and the way they function online. Although we have discredited the fluid nature 
of cyberspace, we do hope that one day it will turn into a zone unrestricted by essentialist 
social order and its undisclosed potential will come into force. As for now, however, the 
virtual worlds remain mere reflections of the already familiar reality and cyberspace cannot 
be “regarded as an arena inherently free of the same old gender relations and struggles” 
(Wilding 2001: n.p.). 
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